attention. It was also an American response to China's campaign of global activism, which included economic and diplomatic outreach to Latin America and Africa and Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which was designed to establish Beijing's economic leadership from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean, across South and Central Asia, and ultimately to Europe. Donald Trump's statements during the 2016 presidential election campaign, and his policies since taking office, give no indication that he will make an effort to restart the Pivot to the IAP region. While it is still early in the Trump presidency it seems clear that his approach to foreign policy will be reactive and transactional. He will respond to events as they surface in any region of the world, guided by no particular priority other than "making America great again" and negotiating trade deals that favor the U.S. President Trump's expressed support for an increased defense budget and a second-to none military may result in the U.S. fulfilling The Asia Foundation's call for a robust American presence in the IAP. But there is no reason to expect American foreign policy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region to be either sustained or consistent. It is at least possible that an unpredictable and inconsistent American presence in the IAP will encourage key IAP governments to take greater responsibility for regional security. But it is more likely that The Asia Foundation will be proven correct in its warning that "A precipitous reduction of engagement in Asia would….trigger massive destabilization of the regional order." (Asian Views…, 2016, p. X) 
Support Asian Regional Architecture and Institutions
In a speech at West Point in 2014, Barack Obama stated that "There are a lot of folks, a lot of skeptics, who often downplay the effectiveness of multilateral action….I think they're wrong." (Wilner, 2014) His commitment to multilaterism represented a major break with his predecessor, who was deeply suspicious of "going it with others", particularly after the 9/11 attacks. (Wolfers, 1962) It was also a break from the policies of Bill Clinton, who became increasingly critical of multilateral forms of cooperation throughout his term in office. Obama was particularly attracted to multilateral arrangements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The aforementioned U.S. engagement with the various ASEAN institutions, Washington's leadership of the TPP discussions, and the Obama team's efforts to encourage various forms of minilateral collaboration are notable examples of this approach to foreign policy. In some cases, particularly in his interactions with ASEAN, the President was vulnerable to the criticism that he was mistaking talk for action and process for product. It can nonetheless be argued that Obama left the United States in better shape, with more opportunities for influencing developments in the IAP region, as a result of his efforts to work with, and through, regional institutions.
Many of Donald Trump's comments during the 2016 campaign cast doubt on his interest in multilateralism. Since taking office, however, the President has attended some major multilateral meetings, including a NATO summit and a G-20 conference. More importantly for this essay, President Trump has agreed to attend three upcoming IAP summits in Novemberthe U.S.-ASEAN summit and the East Asia Summit in the Philippines and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Vietnam. The White House has confirmed that the President looks forward to discussing trade, security and the situation in the South China Sea while he is in Asia. ("Pence confirms", 2017) This is an encouraging sign, but it remains to be seen whether the President will use these meetings to communicate American interest in regional peace and prosperity or as opportunities to put various governments on notice about burden sharing (the NATO precedent) or to communicate American opposition to some universally accepted policy or principle (the G-20 Climate Change precedent).
Regardless of how the President performs at these upcoming IAP meetings, there can be no doubt that he believes that the "art of the deal" is best served by one-on-one interactions, particularly with partners that are not strong enough to put up a fight. The Obama team encouraged multilateral cooperation as a good in itself and as a way of strengthening the network of America's regional friends and allies in order to "shape" Chinese interests and behavior. One-on-one deliberations with key IAP governments may be effective at obtaining short term trade benefits for the United States, but it will be difficult for Washington to patch together these bilateral deals in a way that effectively influences Beijing and bolsters regional order. In order for bilateral negotiations to be successful in the long term they must be placed in a strategic context, which leads us back to the question -if not the Pivot, then what?
Ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
TPP was the most visible, and potentially consequential, component of the Obama administration's Pivot campaign. If President Trump had continued every other element of his predecessor's Pivot strategy but cancelled American participation in TPP his foreign policy would have been fundamentally incompatible with Obama's. By scrapping TPP President Trump cleared the way for China to establish itself as the undisputed sponsor of a new regional economic order. Beijing has moved quickly to market its own Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in the IAP and to encourage Asian governments to join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Indeed, with 56 members and 24 prospective members, the AIIB has gone in a matter of a couple of years from being an Asian regional organization to being a powerful global institution. (Asian Infrastructure website) Washington is conspicuously absent from this organization.
Donald Trump was not the only influential American critic of TPP, of course. During her tenure as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton claimed that "This TPP sets the gold standard in trade agreements." (Carroll, 2015) But when she was faced with challenges from the left wing of her own party during her presidential campaign she reversed her position on TPP. Her criticisms of the agreement tended to focus on its purported negative impact on jobs and wages in the United States. Missing from her arguments, however, and missing from Donald Trump's criticisms of the pact, was any serious consideration of the geopolitical consequences of cancellation of TPP for the United States and its regional friends and allies. As Robert Blackwill and Theodore Rappleye have argued, "Without TPP, the United States will be less equipped to protect its allies from Beijing's pressure. Furthermore, U.S. allies in Asia saw TPP as a symbol of the U.S. commitment to the region. Without it, they are more likely to increasingly doubt America's willingness to defend them and therefore be tempted to acquiesce to China's hegemonic agenda." (Blackwill & Rappleye, 2017) 
Rethink U.S. Strategy on the Korean Peninsula
The Korean peninsula is the most dangerous of the eight potential flashpoints that Zbigniew Brzezinski has identified in the IAP region. (Brzezinski, 2012, p. 158 The problems faced by the Obama administration in its effort to contain and control Pyongyang became more serious when Kim Jung-un became North Korea's "Supreme Leader" in December, 2011 and began a campaign of purges and repression which has convinced many commentators that he is mentally unstable. Since coming to power Kim has accelerated North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and testing of long range missiles.
Obama's critics accused him of "strategic patience" -usually meant to imply complete paralysis -in the face of North Korea's provocations. In fact, the Obama team tried many policies -most notably, economic sanctions -while working with or through South Korea, Japan, China, and the United Nations to influence Pyongyang. In spite of these efforts, three months before the end of the Obama administration James Clapper, the President's Director of National Intelligence, stated that "The notion of getting North Koreans to denuclearize is probably a lost cause." (Davenport, 2017) The fact that the situation has reached this point is certainly frustrating, but it is incumbent on those who criticize Obama's 'strategic patience' to put forward a better approach.
For the time being, the best option for Washington is to continue to work with Seoul to present Pyongyang with a united front, while cultivating regional and international support for an effective form of coercive diplomacy. Unfortunately, threats by the Trump administration that the U.S. might renegotiate the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, and hints that Washington might pressure Seoul to increase its financial support for American bases in South Korea were precisely the wrong messages to send to Moon Jae-in just prior to the start of his term as South Korea's President. The U.S. comments about the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system were particularly problematic for Seoul, since China was already placing intense diplomatic and economic pressure on South Korea over its decision to host the missile defense system. As Adam Mount (2017) has noted, "…the drama surrounding the deployment has already turned THAAD from a source of strength into a political liability."
Several commentators have questioned the reliability of America's South Korean ally, citing Seoul's economic stake in cooperation with Beijing and statements by President Moon in support of a new "sunshine policy" toward North Korea. Such criticisms fail to take into account the difficulty and fragility of South Korea's strategic situation. Indeed, it can be argued that President Moon faces the toughest job in the world. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that some South Korean policies seem to be contradictory. While extending olive branches to Pyongyang and cultivating economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing, Moon has increased defense spending and accelerated some programs begun by his predecessor to provide South Korea with new capabilities for preemption, missile defense and retaliation. (Mizokami, 2017) Above all, President Moon cannot allow his disagreements with Washington to push him toward policies which will undermine, or appear to weaken, the U.S.-South Korea alliance relationship.
Frustration with President Trump's comments led Moon to state on June 1 that South Korea "will take the lead in dealing with Korean peninsula issues without relying on the role of foreign countries." (Mount, 2017) Since Seoul has more skin in the game than any other nation, it makes sense that it should take the lead on various issues relating to North Korea. But it is essential that any South Korean policies of engagement with or compellence toward Pyongyang be anchored in close policy coordination with the United States.
Pursue a Balanced Approach Towards China
Most U.S. commentators and policy makers support close cooperation between Seoul and Washington on the North Korean problem. They also agree with Doug Bandow (2016) that "progess in Pyongyang must go through Beijing," This is only one of several issues that demand Sino-American cooperation. The Obama Pivot campaign was moderately successful in cultivating bilateral cooperation on a number of topics, including climate change, Iran's nuclear program, and confidence building and conflict avoidance measures. (Xinhua, 2017) But the fact that the U.S. had to rely upon the San Francisco network of alliances and defense agreements as the foundation for its policies in the IAP reinforced Beijing's suspicion that the Pivot was just a new form of military containment. (Stuart, 2012) China confronted the U.S. with double digit increases in its annual defense budgets during most of the Obama era, with the result that by the time that President Trump was inaugurated Beijing had the second largest defense budget in the world, and the largest navy in the Pacific. China had also made significant progress in the development of military facilities in contested territories in the South China Sea, giving Beijing an enhanced capability to blockade essential sea lanes and threaten American naval and base assets in the Western Pacific. Washington has responded with increased funding for weapons systems that are specifically designed to eliminate Chinese anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
As the two governments continue to ratchet up their military forces and engage in risky air and naval maneuvers, Graham Allison warns that the two sides are inching closer to the "Thucydides Trap", which he defines as the "…natural, inevitable discombobulation that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power." (Allison, 2017 (2017) any such actions by the U.S. will run up against a "leverage deficit" that will limit the impact of such actions on a Chinese economy that is much more diversified and much less dependent on exports to America than was the case a decade ago. Furthermore, unless such actions are carefully coordinated with America's friends and allies in the IAP region they will have damaging ripple effects on the economies of these governments.
Hass and Dollar conclude that "Given the stakes involved and the need to ensure that any action generates more benefit than loss to the U.S. economy, the Trump administration should tread carefully before taking unilateral actions that could have broad and direct impacts on U.S.
interests." (Hass & Dollar, 2017 The Asia Foundation's call for "balanced" American relations with China would be difficult for any president faced with the prospect of being displaced by Beijing within the global economy. But formulating and sustaining a balanced foreign policy is likely to be especially difficult for a President who is prone to mercurial, ad hoc, and often contradictory statements and policies. Donald Trump's hints at a reassessment of the One China policy and his comments on the need for key Asian allies to contribute more in support of the U.S. military presence in the IAP region have been walked back by members of the Trump administration. But these are the kinds of gratuitously provocative statements that cannot, and will not, be forgotten by Asian governments in general, and China in particular. It is safe to predict that we are in for a bumpy ride.
Ratify the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea
In the first year of his presidency Barack Obama began an ultimately unsuccessful campaign to press the Senate to ratify the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). His two predecessors in the White House had engaged in similar campaigns and experienced similar frustrations. All three presidents had assumed that by making military, diplomatic, and economic arguments in support of a treaty signed by 168 nations they could overcome the concerns of key senators about infringements on American sovereignty. They were misinformed. It is not yet clear, but not likely, that President Trump will make the same mistake.
Critics of the UNCLOS treaty (many of whom prefer the acronym LOST) are driven by more than a knee-jerk antipathy to all international agreements. They worry about the powers that would be wielded by the administrating Authority, whose "purpose isn't to be helpful. It is to redistribute resources to irresponsible Third World governments with a sorry history of squandering abundant foreign aid." (Bandow, 2004) Opponents of the treaty are also concerned about the constraints that UNCLOS would impose on U.S. deep seabed mining operations. "Mining approval would be highly politicized and could discriminate against American operators." (Bandow, 2004) Finally, opponents have warned that "All indications are that if we joined the Law of the Sea treaty, that all kinds of meritless environmental lawsuits would be brought against us." (Groves, 2016) Weighing against these concerns are the arguments of Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama that treaty ratification would create opportunities for American leadership on issues of maritime transit and seabed mining. Supporters of the treaty also note that the U.S. already abides by the rules of the treaty, but is not able to derive influence from such activities since it is not a signatory to the Convention. These arguments have been reinforced by a succession of military leaders and national security policy makers who have testified as to the benefits that the U.S. would derive from being able to refer to UNCLOS in support of freedom of navigation and dispute settlement. UNCLOS's importance as a mechanism for dispute settlement was recently demonstrated by the Philippine's recourse to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in support of its challenge to Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Washington contends that such territorial disputes should be resolved by multilateral negotiations. This is certainly preferable to the unilateral position espoused by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson during his confirmation hearings, when he asserted that "…access to those islands … is not going to be allowed." (Forsythe, 2017) But as Christopher Mirasola has argued, this American position is undermined by its failure to ratify UNCLOS "the most comprehensive mechanism for multilateral resolution of maritime disputes." (Mirasola, 2015) A recent article in People's Daily also claimed that Washington's "outsider position" with regard to the treaty "…undercuts its message as it urges China to respect global maritime norms." (People's Daily,
2016)
In the last months of his second term President Obama gave voice to his frustration over the UNCLOS issue. "If we're truly concerned about China's actions in the South China Sea…the Senate should help strengthen our case by approving the Law of the Sea convention, as our military leaders have urged." (Obama, 2016) As President Trump looks for ways to compensate for America's "leverage deficit" in its relations with Beijing, he would be well advised to take seriously the arguments of his predecessor.
Work With India to Address South Asian Security
Robert Kaplan has observed that "As the United States and China become great power rivals, the direction in which India tilts could determine the course of geopolitics in Eurasia in the twenty-first century. India, in other words, looms as the ultimate pivot state." (Kaplan, 2012, p. 228 "substantial enabler" of bilateral security cooperation, the LEMOA will facilitate future sharing of facilities for refueling and supply activities. (Panda, 2016) To date, President Trump has continued the campaign of active recruitment of India that characterized his predecessor. The President has stated that "There won't be any relationship that will be more important to us" than U.S.-India ties. (Rogin, 2017) The President also went beyond rhetoric during Modi's visit to the White House, where the two sides discussed cooperation against "radical Islamic Terrorism" and announced plans for the largestever maritime exercises in the Indian Ocean, which will include Japanese warships. The U.S. also agreed to sell New Delhi 22 Predator Guardian drones at a cost of $2 billion. ("Trump and Modi
Hug, 2017) It is nonetheless important to note that New Delhi is still concerned about American reliability and still committed to "the core objective…to give India maximum options in its relations with the outside world." (Nonalignment 2.0, 2012, p. 8) It remains to be seen if the Trump administration can exercise the patience and quiet persistence that will be required to cultivate this bilateral relationship. Secretary of Defense James Mattis informed Congress that his office would complete a strategy document by mid-July, but this deadline has passed. When the document is launched, it is quite possible that it will boil down to "keep calm and carry on," with recommendations for a modest increase in the current U.S. troop strength of 8,400. This is not the worst outcome for the time being, since any precipitous action by Washington risks generating new problems for the U.S. and its allies beyond the Afghanistan/Pakistan borders. It would be especially damaging to American and allied interests if the Trump administration were to summarily leave Afghanistan. As noted by The Asia Foundation report, "Poor governance is often the cradle of terrorism and instability, and to counter such instability the U.S. must continue to promote the rule of law, build civil society, and support economic and development measures that increase Afghanistan's national capacity to effectively govern and to provide for its own security." (Asian Views…, 2016, p. XII)
Do Not Abandon Afghanistan

Continue to Play a Leading Role in Nontraditional Security
The authors of The Asia Foundation report list disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and "mitigating the effects of climate change" as some of the areas in which Asian states "…want the United States to continue to lead and to facilitate cooperation." (Asian Views…, 2016, p. XII) As Kurt Campbell reminds us, the IAP region is especially vulnerable to these threats. "Today, Asia is home to nine of the top ten countries in terms of casualties attributable to natural disasters, and its people are twenty-five times more likely to be affected by a natural disaster than are Americans or Europeans." (Campbell, 2016, p. 61 % in Australia, and from 78% to 24 % in Japan. (Wike, et al, 2017) Unless there is a fundamental reversal of the direction of American foreign policy, support for the United States is likely to continue to decline across the IAP region.
Conclusion
The Obama administration's Pivot to Asia had lost much of its focus and its momentum by the time that Donald Trump was elected. The foundational assumptions of the Obama strategy were nonetheless still valid, and the interests of the United States and of its friends and allies in the IAP region would still be best served by a campaign to restart the Pivot. This option appears to never have been considered by the Trump administration. It is at least possible that under some circumstances President Trump's transactional approach to policy making may generate breakthroughs. For example, one can imagine a situation in which one of the President's unscripted comments resonates with the leadership in Beijing and leads to productive dialogue between the two governments. Unfortunately, it is much more likely that the President's antistrategic foreign policy will reinforce Asian suspicions about America's reliability and encourage these governments to look for alternatives to a U.S.-sponsored security order.
